



Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
The M2 Slowdown and
Depository Intermediation:
Implications for Monetary Policy
by John B. Carlson and Katherine A. Samolvk
\_^ ongress requires that the Chairman
of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve report semiannually on the Sys-
tem's plans and objectives for monetary
policy. Among its financial objectives,
the Federal Reserve has placed the great-
est emphasis on its target ranges for the
M2 measure of money since around the
mid-1980s. M2 comprises currency,
checking and savings deposits, money
market mutual funds (MMMFs), and
certificates of deposit in denominations
less than $100,000 (small CDs).
In February, the Fed's policymaking
arm, the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee (FOMC), set an M2 growth range
objective of 21/2 to 6V2 percent for
1992. But despite policy actions includ-
ing a half-percentage-point reduction
in the discount rate and a substantial
decline in short-term interest rates this
year, M2 now stands below the lower
bound of its target range. In presenting
the Federal Reserve's midyear report,
Chairman Alan Greenspan noted, "The
weakness of the broad monetary aggre-
gates appears importantly to have
reflected the variety of pressures that
rechanneled credit flows away from
depository institutions, lessening their
need to issue monetary liabilities."
A key issue is what the rechanneling of
credit flows implies for the link between
money and the economy. Does the recent
M2 weakness portend an overall slow-
down, as the historical relationship
between M2 and economic activity
would suggest? More fundamentally,
what does this mean for monetary tar-
geting in general? Is the M2 aggregate
a suitable measure for money? This
Economic Commentary seeks to ad-
dress these questions and to analyze
low M2 growth by looking at how the
role of banks and thrifts has evolved in
the changing financial environment of
the past decade.
• Money and Its
Relationship to the Economy
The problem of interpreting distur-
bances in the relationship between
money growth and the economy is
nothing new for policymakers. The
postwar period has been punctuated by
several episodes when money growth
has persistently been above or below
the target ranges for reasons not well
understood or anticipated. For example,
in the mid-1970s, policymakers were
puzzled by slackness in the Ml meas-
ure (essentially currency and checkable
deposits), which received the primary
policy focus at the time. Research later
revealed that this weakness reflected, at
least in part, financial innovation in-
duced by regulatory restrictions in the
face of high interest rates. The develop-
ment of money-like instruments such
as MMMFs and the adoption of cash-
management techniques allowed total
spending in the aggregate economy to
grow more rapidly than expected rela-
tive to Ml balances.
The roles of banks and thrifts have
changed significantly over the past dec-
ade in response to evolving financial
markets and regulatory structure. The
resulting pressures have rechanneled
credit flows away from depositories, a
trend that has generated important
implications for the interpretation of
money growth.
A more permanent disruption in the link
between M1 and spending occurred in
the early 1980s. This time, Ml grew
more rapidly than anticipated. Subse-
quent studies showed that this break-
down was largely in response to
deregulation and disinflation. The more
permanent nature of this shift is evident
in the ratio of nominal GDP to Ml—
the velocity of Ml, which experienced
a clear break in its trend after 1980 (see
figure 1). The attractiveness of M2 as
an alternative policy guide at that time
was evident in the relative stability of
its velocity, which continued to revert
to a constant average value, despite a
rapidly changing financial world. More-
over, the M2 aggregate was redefined
to include new instruments such as
MMMFs, making it a more comprehen-
sive measure of money.
In a world of evolving financial
markets, defining money is a perpetual
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weighted average of M2's broad component yields.
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of Economic Analysis.
issue. While a priori considerations
often constrain the set of instruments
identified as money, principles alone
have not yet yielded a universally ac-
cepted definition. Monetary theorists
have tended to stress either the
"medium of exchange" function or the
"liquidity" function. Obviously, money
facilitates transactions and serves as a
temporary abode of purchasing power.
Such criteria, however, provide an un-
certain guide to the classification of as-
sets into those that serve as a medium
of exchange and those that do not. The
uncertainty associated with the liquidity
criterion is even greater.
Recognizing such limitations, economists
Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz
conclude,"... the definition of money is
an issue to be decided, not on the
grounds of principle as in the a priori
approach, but on grounds of usefulness in
organizing our knowledge of economic
relationships." They argue that conditions
affecting the demand for "money" are
relatively stable, such that the quantities
of real money balances can be explained
by a few key variables. More precisely,
"... the desideratum is a monetary total
whose real value ... bears a relatively
stable relation ... to a small number of
variables that theoretical considerations
lead us to believe affect the real quan-
tity of money demanded .....,3
• Velocity and Money Demand
Indeed, many economists believe that
the mean-reverting behavior of M2
velocity is the consequence of a stable
demand function. The demand for M2
balances in an individual's portfolio, as
well as in the economy's, is assumed to
be largely determined by nominal
spending and by the opportunity cost
of M2—that is, the interest forgone
from holding M2 components as op-
posed to higher-yielding but nonmone-
tary instruments, such as stocks, bonds,
and other assets not included in M2.
Thus, the demand for M2 varies in-
versely with the spread between ex-
pected returns on nonmonetary instru-
ments and deposit rates. Since these
interest-rate differentials alter desired
deposit holdings but do not affect
spending, the velocity of M2 changes.
For example, when market rates rise
relative to deposit rates, less M2 is de-
manded relative to nominal GDP, and
velocity increases.
Because M2 includes a number of dif-
ferent household assets, the responsive-
ness of the demand for this aggregate—
its interest sensitivity —is related to a
variety of interest rates across the
maturity spectrum. Nonetheless, con-
ventional models for M2 demand some-
times ignore the long-term nature of
small time deposits (STDs) as a share
of M2. Instead, they measure the oppor-
tunity cost of M2 as the difference be-
tween the three-month Treasury bill
rate and the share-weighted average of
the aggregate's broad component
yields (see figure 2). Such a measure
presumes that all depository compo-
nents are relatively close substitutes for
three-month Treasury bills. This pre-
sumption seems to have worked well
until 1988, as the systematic relation-
ship between M2 velocity and oppor-
tunity cost would suggest.
Since then, however, M2 growth has
been associated with a greater increase
in nominal spending—that is, higher
M2 velocity—than models using the
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cost would predict. A potential explana-
tion for this breakdown is that these
models may not have adequately ac-
counted for the interest sensitivity of
the demand for M2's various compo-
nents. In other words, the conventional
measure of opportunity cost may not
be appropriate if the interest sensitivi-
ties of the components are dissimilar.
This rationale is particularly appealing
in light of the large differentials in
yields currently available on longer-
term versus shorter-term securities.
To investigate this hypothesis, it is use-
ful to examine the recent behavior of
M2 components separately. Not surpris-
ingly, we find that M2's weakness is
largely concentrated in STDs, a com-
ponent for which opportunity cost has
been rising, not falling. STD growth
leveled out in 1989 and began to fall in
1991. This year, the disparity between
the growth of STDs and other M2 com-
ponents has been sharply magnified
(see figure 3). Interestingly, the willing-
ness of depositories to let STDs run off
suggests that they have chosen not to
compete for funds in the market for
term instruments—a notion that we
contend is supported by broader
trends in financial intermediation.
A closer look at deposit yields confirms
this suspicion. Offering rates on term
deposits have fallen much more in
response to declining market rates than
have yields paid on nonterm deposits
(see figure 4, panel A). This comparison
is particularly striking between other
checkable deposits (OCDs) and CDs
with maturities greater than 2'/2 years.
Bankers, fearing they might offend
long-standing customers, may have
been reluctant to lower offering rates on
core deposits such as OCDs. Thus, the
spread between the OCD rate and the
three-month Treasury bill rate has nar-
rowed sharply since 1990, as banks
have responded sluggishly (see figure
4, panel B).
Offering rates on CDs of at least 2
l/2
years' maturity, on the other hand, have
led the market down, with the spread
between these deposits and five-year
Treasury notes actually widening since
mid-1991. What this pattern suggests is
that STDs may be closer substitutes for
market instruments of intermediate
maturities than previously thought.
Thus, the recent plunge in these
deposits could reflect a portfolio
response to the widening spread be-
tween short-term and longer-term
yields. The common opportunity cost
measure does not include rates of
longer-term components or of their
close substitutes.
Preliminary research indicates that
even if the opportunity cost measure
included a more detailed accounting of
longer-term rates, the models would
fail to explain the recent slowness in
M2. This suggests that a composite
measure of M2 opportunity cost may
still not be adequate, particularly when
the spread between yields on long-term
and short-term instruments is at record
levels, as is currently the case.
• Trends in Money versus Credit
Indications that banks seem to be let-
ting certain types of deposits run off
are consistent with Chairman Green-
span's reference to pressures that have
rechanneled credit flows away from de-
pository institutions and into other ve-
hicles, such as higher-yielding nonbank
investments. This shift in the supply of
credit has been dramatic. MMMFs,
which invest mainly in short-termcredit market instruments, and bond
and equity funds have grown consider-
ably (see figure 5). Indeed, while the
total amount of credit supplied by all
private intermediaries continues to in-
crease as a share of GDP, the ratio of
funds supplied by depositories to GDP
has been declining since late 1988 (see
figure 6).
As noted above, the decision to hold
bank liabilities versus other financial
claims is determined in part by relative
yields. These yields, however, ultimately
reflect the returns on the investments be-
ing funded by banks relative to those on
nonbank alternatives. When the demand
for the types of credit traditionally ad-
vanced by depositories is low compared
to the demand for nonbank credit,
banks have less incentive to compete
for investors' funds. Alternatively, when
the relative costs of supplying bank
credit increase—for example, because
of regulatory constraints—it also be-
comes less profitable for banks to at-
tract deposits. In either case, as credit
is channeled through nondepository
financial intermediaries (whose liabili-
ties are not included in M2) rather than
through banks and thrifts, the growth
of M2 may be low relative to that of
broader credit-market aggregates and
nominal spending.
• The Decline in Depository
Intermediation
The shift in credit flows away from
depositories has been exacerbated both
by sluggish loan demand and by the
continuing consolidation in the deposi-
tory institution industry. It is not un-
usual for the share of credit flows ad-
vanced by depositories to decline in
periods of slow economic growth as
bank customers reduce their demand for
credit along with their planned expendi-
tures on capital goods, durables, and
real estate. Moreover, in the current
business cycle, the magnitude of the
contraction in depository credit flows
no doubt mirrors the boom and subse-
quent bust of the real estate market—
especially on the commercial side.
The potentially expansionary effects of
declining short-term interest rates on the
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of Economic Analysis.economy have been blunted by struc-
tural problems confronting banks and
thrifts. These institutions have been
forced to make balance-sheet adjust-
ments to deal with problems of asset
quality, inadequate capital, and the ris-
ing costs associated with banking
regulation, supervision, and deposit in-
The most explicit example of such
structural adjustments is in the thrift in-
dustry, where insolvent institutions are
being sold or assumed by the Resolu-
tion Trust Corporation (RTC). In turn,
more than $90 billion in thrift assets
are currently on the books of the RTC,
where they are funded by the sale of
government securities rather than by
deposits. In cases where deposits of in-
solvent thrifts are sold, acquiring insti-
tutions are permitted to abrogate time
deposit contracts and offer the currently
low interest rates. Such is often the
case for brokered deposits, which are
typically held by interest-rate-sensitive
investors who are likely to shift such
holdings to higher-yielding instru-
ments, such as bond funds.
The deterioration in asset quality ex-
tends beyond thrifts. In recent years,
many banks have seen a sizable share
of their loans turn sour, particularly
those made to finance commercial real
estate. With diminished capital, many
banks have been led to cut dividends
and to tighten lending terms. One con-
sequence of the effort to rebuild capital
has been a widening of the spread be-
tween lending rates and the cost of
funds—largely determined by rates
paid on M2 deposits. At the same time,
investors have been raising risk pre-
miums on depository debt and managed
liabilities, increasing the cost of funds.
The costs of depository intermediation
have been further augmented by rising
insurance premiums and by more-
stringent regulatory capital require-
ments. In the face of increasing inter-
mediation costs, depositories have
strong incentives to sell off some assets,
a process known as securitization. The
net effect of these efforts has been to re-
duce the profitability of traditional bank
funding, including the issuance of
deposit liabilities included in M2.
• Policy Implications
The evidence presented above suggests
that M2's recent weakness reflects the
joint response of individual portfolio
holders and financial intermediaries to
the relative yields and changing costs of
depository intermediation. From this per-
spective, it is not so very puzzling that
M2 velocity is above its long-run average
value. Hence, because the level of eco-
nomic activity associated with M2 growth
is currently greater than historical rela-
tionships would indicate, it is appropriate
for policymakers to respond cautiously to
weakness in the aggregate.
A glimpse at the first half of 1992 re-
veals such behavior on the part of the
FOMC. In February, the Committee
projected that the monetary objective
would be associated with a growth rate
of nominal GDP of about 4!/2 to 5
3/4
percent for the year. Recent estimates
of nominal GDP indicate growth of just
under 5 percent in the first half of the
year, roughly consistent with the
FOMC's projections. M2, on the other
hand, is currently below the lower
bound of its 2Vi to 6V2 percent range,
revealing an unanticipated increase in
its velocity of more than 2 percent.
In light of the weakness of M2 and evi-
dence of a sluggish economy, the
FOMC has acted on three occasions
this year, following a dramatic response
in December. As a result, the federal
funds rate has declined almost 2 per-
centage points since last November.
The Board of Governors has acted
twice over this period, reducing the dis-
count rate by 1 percentage point in
December and by V2 percentage point
in April. Ml and the monetary base
have responded; however, recent data
indicate that M2 growth continues to
lag. Consequently, the cautious ap-
proach of the FOMC seems to be jus-
tified as long as M2 velocity increases
as projected and the economy con-
tinues to grow within the range of the
Committee's projections.
An important issue for future policy is
whether the velocity effects of reduced
depository intermediation are perma-
nent or transitory. Should depository
credit demands pick up, one might ex-
pect more-aggressive deposit rate pric-
ing. Thus, M2 could rebound substan-
tially in the short run. On the other
hand, banks have greatly increased
their holdings of government securi-
ties, which could be sold to fund addi-
tional loan demand.
Some analysts have argued that the
recent decline in depository intermedia-
tion is essentially the unwinding of an
unsustainable process that emerged
during the 1980s. As figure 6 indi-
cates, domestic nonfinancial sector
debt supplied by depositories as a share
of GDP was relatively stable throughout
the decade. However, the share of total
debt funded by depositories has been
on the decline since 1975. The relative
stability of M2 velocity in the past dec-
ade hence could have been an artifact
of this trend in tandem with the debt
buildup of the period.
The secular decline in the importance
of banks and thrifts raises the possibil-
ity that the M2 velocity puzzle reflects
more-fundamental changes in the finan-
cial sector. The shift away from depos-
itory intermediation suggests that
velocity effects could be permanent as
rising costs inhibit depositories from
recapturing market share. Once struc-
tural adjustments take place, M2 veloc-
ity could restabilize, albeit at a perma-
nently higher level.
Nevertheless, given that depository
credit has been roughly proportionate
to nominal GDP over the past two
decades, one could contend that the fac-
tors contributing to the debt buildup
are unrelated to the longer-run level of
depository intermediation. Even if
depository credit should decline rela-
tive to nominal spending in the future,
however, banks could compensate by
reducing managed liabilities not in-
cluded in M2.• Concluding Remarks
Ideally, policymakers would like to
supply just the right amount of money
for ensuring price stability, the sine qua
non for a healthy, growing economy. In
practice, however, it is no simple matter
to implement such a policy. Occasion-
ally, economic relationships are stable
enough for the Federal Reserve to
achieve an objective for money growth
with some confidence in the objective's
consistency with its ultimate goal of
price stability. The mid- to late 1980s
seemed to be such a period.
From time to time, however, the FOMC
confronts accumulating evidence that
the relationships on which its policy
decisions rely are breaking down.
Sometimes the shifts are permanent,
such as was the case with Ml in the
early 1980s. Unfortunately, it takes
time before the evidence is sufficient to
warrant a corresponding change in
focus to alternative financial objectives.
Indeed, if the association between M2
and spending is permanently altered, it
may take years before the new relation-
ship is identified.
Experience over the past three decades
has revealed that it is a mistake to im-
plement policy on the pretext that
money growth can be manipulated to
achieve predictable, favorable effects
on economic activity in the short run.
There are times, however, when policy-
makers must make judgments about
changes in the relationship between
money and the economy. A recent ex-
ample occurred in 1983, when persist-
ent effects on M2 velocity had relevant
implications for the appropriate M2 tar-
get. With hindsight, it is now obvious
that the temporary surge in M2 growth
in that year was not an indicator of ex-
cessive monetary expansion. Whether
the current weakness in M2 indicates
excessive tightness may not be deter-
mined for years.
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